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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
ter, however, it is probable that the commission would be more
hesitant to exercise a broad discretion in revoking a permit pre-
viously issued, and the courts more inclined to interfere with
such exercise of discretion, than in the case of an original denial
of a permit. A syndicate in Minnesota had issued ten-year
installment certificates with a surrender value, from the second
to the sixth year, less than the principal amounts paid. Large
numbers of purchasers, having failed to meet their payments
during this period, suffered losses. The securities commission,
empowered to withhold or suspend licenses where plans of busi-
ness were fraudulent or would work a fraud on purchasers, sus-
pended the syndicate's license. On certiorari the court held that
the fact an investment often proves imprudent is no ground
for revocation of the permit in the absence of fraud.27
In view of the fact that there has been so little litigation on
the extent of the administrative authorities' power under Blue
Sky Laws, it is futile to attempt to predict the applicable future
rules of judicial decision. It must be remembered that the pow-
ers will necessarily vary somewhat under the different types of
statutes. Nevertheless, the cases cited do show a marked atti-
tude on the part of the courts to leave the commissions a broad
discretion, in keeping with a growing policy in this country of
turning over the determination of rights to administrative bodies.
JEROME A. GROSS, '31, and RICHARD W. BROWN, '31.
SOME RECENT METHODS OF HARASSING THE
HABITUAL CRIMINAL
INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of organized crime in the larger cities of this
country, to a degree unheard of even a decade ago and un-
dreamed of even today in the cities of other civilized nations
throughout the world, is familiar to every reader of a metropoli-
tan newspaper. Particularly shocking is the condition which
to, if upon examination into the affairs of the issuer of such security it
shall appear that the issuer: (1) is insolvent; or (2) has violated any of
the provisions of this act or any order of the [Commissioner] [Commission]
of which such issuer has notice; or (3) has been or is engaged or is about
to engage in fraudulent transactions; or (4) is in any other way dishonest
or has made fraudulent representations in any prospectus or in any circular
or other literature that has been distributed concerning the issuer or its
securities; or (5) is of bad business repute; or (6) does not conduct its
business in accordance with law; or (7) that its affairs are in an unsound
condition; or (8) that the enterprise or business of the issuer or the se-
curity is not based upon sound business principles."
'In re Investors' Syndicate (1920) 147 Minn. 217, 174 N. W. 1001.
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has existed and does exist at this time in certain cities where
organized gangsters, racketeers, extortionists, and hoodlums of
all sorts have ushered in an era of lawlessness and violence with-
out parallel in history. The publicity attendant upon this par-
ticular situation, and most recently upon the measures adopted
by the local authorities in their attempt to curb the wave of
organized crime, has raised some rather interesting questions
and debate, not only on the particular method or methods em-
ployed in what is, after all, an extreme and unusual situation,
but on the methods of metropolitan police in general.
This article is not intended as a criticism of police or police
methods in general. It is not intended to condemn or seek to
focus attention upon any particular practice of the police or
prosecuting officials of any particular municipality, for any par-
ticular act or series of acts. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be
taken as an attempt to justify in general any irregular or extra-
legal measures adopted by police forces anywhere. It is, rather,
an attempt to outline briefly some methods, more or less removed
from the usual routine of indictment, arrest, and prosecution of
offenders, which have been adopted by the prosecuting authori-
ties and police of large cities in their war on organized crime
and criminals. To outline a few of these measures, as accurate-
ly as possible, and present a portion of the discussion, both
critical and in justification, which their use has invoked, is the
sole purpose of this note.
The discussion herein will be concerned in the main with the
use by prosecuting authorities and the police forces of the larger
cities, in their effort to maintain a higher degree of control over
the so-called "criminal class," of (1) the statutes and ordinances
relating to vagrancy, (2) those which permit arrests on suspicion,
(3) the income tax evasion prohibition, and (4) the fixing of
maximum bail for criminal offenders. The question of the use of
the "third degree" by metropolitan police is not here under discus-
sion; the cases arising under that head have been collected and
comment thereon may be found in 43 HARV. L. REV. 617. Nor
will any discussion be found herein of the problems raised
by the attitude of many prosecuting officials who, despairing of
convictions for serious offenses and being cognizant of the ex-
pense of such prosecutions, encourage offenders to plead to a
lesser offense than that charged in order to secure conviction
and at least temporary incarceration of the offender. That mat-
ter has been effectively noted in the Reports of the Illinois and
Missouri Crime Survey Commissions, and by various textbook
authorities.1
MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION (1929) Ch. VIII, "Justice
by Compromise."
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An investigation, however thorough and detailed, into any one
of the above matters must necessarily result in but little specific
and accurate data. Case material is practically non-existent,
due not only to the fact that the particular developments treated
herein are, in the main, rather recent, but also to the very nature
of the problems involved. It may be said with some degree of
accuracy that those who have occasion to challenge the adoption
by the police authorities of any of the above methods of dealing
with offenders are rarely in a position to force the issue, and
consequently do not. The man adversely affected by any one of
the methods invoked is likely to belong to one of three classes:
first, he may actually be guilty of the offense charged, if va-
grancy, or may later be identified and convicted of a definite
offense if arrested as a suspect; secondly, he may be a dangerous
criminal, with a record of arrests and convictions in remotejurisdictions as well as locally, in which case, though innocent
of the offense charged or suspected, unless desirous of avoiding
a pending charge on a major offense, he may be content to be
held for a short period and released or even to "take the rap"
(to use his dialect) for a minor offense rather than to fight the
charge, a procedure which might entail a more minute scrutiny
of his past record; thirdly, the party seized may be entirely
innocent of any crime but helpless, through lack of finances and
legal training or assistance, to challenge the procedure by a suit
for false arrest and imprisonment, with the outcome uncertain
and damages almost necessarily inconsequential.
Obviously, then, the matter is one not likely to be raised forjudicial determination or cognizance, and the opportunity for
printed appellate court opinions is practically non-existent.
It is only when the issue is raised by some prominent personage,
as by Mr. Clarence Darrow in his recent vigorous opposition to
the procedure in Chicago under the fllinois vagrancy statute,2
or is called to public attention by some rare and particularly
shocking abuse of police power that any material is available.
The only other source of information available is local investi-
gation, which is possible only through the cooperation of the
public prosecutor's office, the police department, members of the
local bar, supplemented by the use of daily newspaper records
and editorials in a given locality or localities. The authentic
material is, then, necessarily limited, and any conclusions based
'Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30, 1930.
'Note: Appreciation is here expressed for the consideration given the
author in his search for material by Prosecuting Attorney Albert Schweitzer
of the City of St. Louis, Joseph Gerk, Chief of Police of that city, and
members of the staffs of the St. Louis Post-Pispatch and the Chicago
Tribune.
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upon the use of any but authentic material are of course open to
challenge. Consequently the material in this article is pre-
sented, not with any view toward generalizations or definite
conclusions on the questions presented, but rather in the belief
that the matter is one of interest to the average man, and in
particular to the members of the legal profession.
I. THE USE OF SUSPECT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
Probably the most well established and most frequently in-
voked method of apprehending known criminals against whom
no specific charge can be placed is to be found in the power of
the metropolitan police to arrest on suspicion. The problems
arising under this procedure, vitally necessary to any effective
police control of the criminal elements, are rather varied, due in
part to the possibility of flagrant abuse of the practice by indi-
vidual officers, who may seize upon it as a means of revenge or
persecution unless their activities are at all times subject to the
most minute scrutiny and supervision. Even then a great deal
must be left to the judgment of the individual arresting officer,
for he alone is in a position to observe the facts in their true
light. About the only necessary requisite for officers in such a
situation, besides a general knowledge of their powers and limi-
tations, is the possession of a normal amount of common sense
and a sense of duty untrammeled by either a zeal for persecution
or desire for notoriety on the one hand, or utter lack of initiative
on the other.
Arrests under the suspect statutes, which are fairly uniform
so far as regards the power of the police, may take one of several
forms. They may be arrests of individual suspicious characters
observed by particular officers in the course of their rounds on
their "beats," under the general power given to metropolitan
police "to prevent crimes and arrest offenders"4 or under the
"power within the city to arrest, on view, any person they see
violating or whom they have reason to suspect of having violated
any law of the state or ordinance of the city."5 The power is
also usually given to "arrest and hold, without warrant, for a
period of time not exceeding twenty-four hours, persons found
within the city charged with having committed felonies in other
states, and who are reported to be fugitives from justice."
On the other hand, such arrests on suspicion may be under a
so-called police "dragnet," "round-up," or "bag arrest" order,
issued in the attempt to secure persons suspected of a recent
major crime in the locality, or even under a general police policy
' As in Mo., under R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 8919.
'As in Mo., under R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 8930.
I Ibid.
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of systematic police supervision of undesirables. To quote a re-
cent English observer of Chicago police methods,7 "they even
go to the extreme of arresting hundreds of suspects for the pur-
pose of identification of 'holdup' cases; the arrests and identi-
fications take place three times weekly. The procedure is either
to release the suspects after the parade, or to charge them with
some light offense, such as vagrancy." 8
In the power to arrest and hold on suspicion is found, of
course, one of the most potent means of detection and prevention
of crime open to the law enforcement officials.9 Whether seized
individually, suspected of a particular offense, or under a police
"dragnet," the individual so seized can be held long enough for
the police to make a thorough investigation of his case. Victims
of recent robberies and other crimes may be asked to view him
in the "shadow box" which is a part of every modern police
headquarters. His appearance may be noted and measurements
checked for purposes of comparison with descriptions of crim-
inals wanted in other jurisdictions. Detectives may mentally
"catalogue" him for future reference. He may be questioned at
length about his present and past record. The solution to many
unsolved crimes is undoubtedly to be found in such a practice.
The method is, of course, subject to abuse, and has at times no
doubt been resorted to by officers not actuated solely by a sense
of duty, even as it is alleged to have been used by officials in an
effort to keep in custody known criminals against whom no
definite charge could be brought. The procedure in such cases
might consist of a continuous series of arrests on suspiciof and
temporary incarcerations, broken only by temporary releases
and almost immediate re-arrests, or of the placing of a charge
of felony so as to insure a more substantial bail than would be
required for an arrest on a minor charge of peace disturbance or
vagrancy.
Quite naturally, then, the procedure under suspect statutes
has come in for criticism, and in some cases, deservedly. But
at the same time it must be borne in mind that the power to
arrest on suspicion is absolutely necessary to law enforcement
under modern metropolitan conditions, and the proper attitude
would seem to call for support of the arresting officer, even if
'Fred. J. Crawley, Observations on American Police Systems, 20 JOURNAL
or AEwmEcRAN INSTITUTE OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 167, 169.
' See II, post.
OFREUND, POLICE POWER (1904) sec. 100, citing REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK CITY MAGISTRATES, which contains the following: "Frequently such
arrest is the first step in the detection of some crime which is investigated,
the proper complainant found, a formal complaint taken, and the prisoner
held for trial."
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acting under mistake, so long as he is actuated solely by a sense
of duty. In the words of the eminent English officer previously
quoted,1o "There are some, however, who feel that the constable
is not getting a fair crack of the whip today; it has become the
custom in the press to pillory and beat him. He has no super-
normal powers-he collects his prisoners when he sees them and
when the public brings them to him or points them out. Those
in high places who castigate police, have never caught a criminal,
know nothing of the difficulties of doing so, nor of preparing
evidence. The fact is that police today are helpless unless
prisoners are arrested as stated above. . . . Unless such a case
is overwhelmingly made out, to determine it is a matter of pure
speculation. In the realm of speculation there is a winner and
a loser. It is clear that the police cannot always be winners,
consequently they must be supported whether they are winners
or losers, providing they are found to be actuated by a sense of
duty. This sense of duty must be broadly interpreted, for it
must be remembered that a constable has no time to consult law
books like his castigators; the constable has to act at once or not
at all. In short, therefore, if police find that they are not sup-
ported when they honestly make a mistake, they may take good
care never to risk making a mistake. Should that happen the
law enforcement fabric would crumble." While it is unfair, in
a sense, to compare British and American criminal statistics,
due to widely differing conditions, the observation can be in-
dulged that the remarkable success of law enforcing officers in
the United Kingdom is due in large part to just such an attitude
of faith in, and support of, the officers by the British public in
general. A plea for such an attitude on the part of the Ameri-
can public is to be found in the statement of the President of the
United States 1 that "what we need is a more widespread public
awakening to the failure of some local governments to protect
their citizens from murder, racketeering, corruption and other
crimes and their rallying in support to the men of these localities
that are today making a courageous battle to clean up these
places."
II. THE USE OF VAGRANCY STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
The method which has served to focus attention upon the
problem in general, and which has occasioned the most com-
ment, is the practice of arresting known criminals under exist-
ing statutes against vagrancy. This method has been invoked
with some degree of success in the Chicago drive against organ-
ized crime within the metropolis, the authorities there operating
Crawley, op. cit., 177.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 25, 1930.
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under the vagrancy statute of the State of Illinois, 12 and the
same procedure has been recently attempted in St. Louis under
both the state statute's and the city ordinance against va-
grants.14 In view of the wide divergence of opinion as to the
legality of the practice, the policy involved, and the vigorous
comment which its use has recently aroused, an examination of
the matter in detail is deemed pertinent here.
Arrests for vagrancy are, of course, nothing new. In ancient
days in England a watchman or even a private citizen, under
statute, might apprehend a common nightwalker., The Stat-
ute of 17 Geo. II authorized such a procedure. The practice
was well recognized in this country in colonial times, and was
incorporated in the earliest law of most of our states. For ex-
ample, the Laws of Missouri Territory of 1818, page 24, provide
for the apprehension of "all other idle, vagrant and dissolute
persons rambling about without any reasonable means of sub-
sistence." A similar provision was incorporated in the first
revision of Missouri laws after the admission of the State to the
Union,6 and is to be found in the various revisions down to the
present. Their constitutionality has almost universally been
sustained,17 as has that of city vagrancy ordinances. 8  What
is true of Missouri is true of most other states as well, although
the provisions vary somewhat with the jurisdiction, some being
more comprehensive in scope than the local enactments.
The evident purpose of such enactments, viewed in the light
of conditions existing at their origin, was to enable the police
to arrest and detain the ordinary tramp or hoodlum and the
frequenter of bawdy houses and other places of ill repute. In
the words of a Missouri decision sustaining a vagrancy con-
viction, 9 "the law does not prohibit anyone from being without
visible means of support, or from being idle, or from loitering
around saloons or gambling houses. Neither one of those things
in itself and alone can be punished as a crime, but when they all
three meet in one person at the same time they constitute a
vagrant, who has been appropriately described as 'the chrysalis
of every species of criminal.'"
While it is true that specific criminal acts would seem to be
required to constitute vagrancy, and that the offense is to be
- R. S. Ill. (Cahill, 1929) c. 38 sec. 606.
" R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 3581.
'
4 Rev. Code of St. Louis (1927) c. 24 art. 9 sec. 1527.
'
5 Wheelhorse's Case (1627) Poph. 208, 79 Eng. Repr. 1297.
"Rev. Laws of Mo. (1825) p. 783.
'
TEx parte Branch (1911) 234 Mo. 466, 137 S. W. 886.
'Roberts v. State (1851) 14 Mo. 138; Kansas City v. Neal (1892) 49
Mo. App. 72.
"Supra, n. 17.
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treated as a crime rather than a status, there is no doubt, to
quote one authority,20 "that the comprehensive definition of the
offense affords the means of dealing with the criminal elements
of the population and keeping them temporarily under restraint
in cases of emergency." Such a power of preventive arrest is
not unknown in this country, and is recognized in Germany as
within the inherent powers of the police.21
The authorities of the city of Chicago, casting about for fur-
ther means of harassing the organized criminal elements which
have operated there in an era of lawlessness unparalleled in
our history, seized upon the vagrancy statute, rarely invoked,
as an available weapon. Taking the list of some twenty-six so-
called "public enemies" compiled by the Chicago Crime Commis-
sion, a local judge 22 issued vagrancy warrants for the entire
group, which comprised every important gang leader in the
city,2-3 and has since issued warrants for other notorious gang-
sters. Arrests followed and the prisoners were admitted to
bail at sums far in excess of those required in ordinary com-
mitments.24 To date several convictions have been secured,
noted gangsters have fled the city or are in hiding to prevent
apprehension, and the effectiveness of the device as a method of
harassing the criminal classes is unquestionably established.
The situation there was, of course, in the nature of an emer-
gency; to quote a local member of the judiciary,25 "A bit of
extra-legal activity is better.than having vigilantes on the lake
front."
Quite naturally this procedure occasioned a storm of protest
and condemnation. One of the first to challenge its legality and
use was the famous attorney, Mr. Clarence Darrow, who secured
the release of two gangsters on $10,000 bond in vagrancy
charges. Mr. Darrow justified his position in the following
words,26 "I broke my resolve to keep out of criminal practice
because I feel that this vagrancy campaign is outrageous. If
authorities wish to harass the lawless, they should indict them
and try them on charges of which they are guilty." Certain of
the judges in the local state courts, in reducing bonds of gang-
sters charged with vagrancy, and sending such cases down to the
city police courts for trial, have refused to be a part of the
"Supra, n. 9.
' Meyer Verwaltungsrecht, p. 162.Municipal Judge John H. Lyle.
" Chicago Tribune, Sept. 17, 1930.
"See Bail, IV, post.
"Chief Justice Harry Olson of Municipal Court, in Chicago Tribune,
Oct. 3, 1930.
" Chicago Tribune, Sept. 7, 1930.
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"howling mob" in the drive against crime.27 The position taken
by many accords with that of a noted writer of several decades
ago,28 in holding that "the whole method of procedure (arresting
known criminals under vagrancy statutes) is in direct contra-
diction of the constitutional provisions that a man shall be con-
victed before punishment, after proof of the commission of a
crime, by direct testimony, sufficient to rebut the presumption
of innocence, which the law accords to everyone charged with a
violation of its provisions. In trials for vagrancy the whole
process is changed, and men are convicted on not much more
than suspicion, (on their record, according to a newspaper
view 29 ) unless they remove it, to employ the language of statute,
by 'giving a good account of themselves."' Insofar as the
police, "over and above the enforcement of the vagrant law,
undertake to supervise and control the actions of the criminal
classes, except when a specific crime has been committed and
the offender is to be arrested therefor, their action is illegal,
and a resistance to the control thus exercised must lead to a re-
lease and acquittal of the offender.".30 As has been indicated
herein, however, the person so seized is rarely in a position
effectively to resist.
The arguments advanced in justification of the practice are
undoubtedly potent. In the words of one of those most active
in the attempt to minimize organized crime in Chicago,,n "The
purpose of the vagrancy act is to apprehend and keep in custody
persons other than the unfortunate man who happens to be out
of work, has no place to sleep or stay, and is found loitering on
the streets. The real purpose of the vagrancy act is clearly, as
can be seen from reading it, intended to cover all persons who
live by unlawful means. That heading certainly is intended to
cover habitual criminals with records of convictions and ar-
rests." But the most forceful justification of the procedure is to
be found in the editorial columns of the city's leading news-
paper,3 2 which is herein quoted, "The Supreme Court's decision
in the Sammons bail case inferentially approves the application
of the vagrancy lawto the modern type of moneyed hoodlums and
'Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7, 1930.
TIEDEMA, LImrrATIONS ON POLICS POWER IN U. S. (1886) sec. 47.
" St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 24, 1930.
"TIEDEMAN, op. cit. sec. 49.
Assistant State's Attorney Charles Rathbun, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 7,
1930.
Hoodlums and the Law, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 20, 1930. The Sammons
case referred to is found in 173 N. E. 8. Sammons, incidentally, was con-
victed of vagrancy, but returned to the penitentiary to serve out an unex-
pired term o4 a murder charge, his parole having been held invalid as
granted on a reduced sentence.
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quiets such doubts as have been felt in some quarters on this point.
We have not shared those doubts and it is reassuring to know that
they are not considered valid by our distinguished tribunal. If the
framers of the statute did not foresee the dilemma into which the
huge profits of prohibition and the resourcefulness of modern
criminal organization has thrust the agencies of the law, they
made it clear in the sweeping terms of the statute that they in-
tended it to meet all possible extensions of lawless living, hood-
lumism, in effect the general conditions we have today. There
is nothing better established in our jurisprudence than the duty
of reinterpreting the phraseology of laws to conform to changes
in conditions. This duty does not justify the distortion of
words or intendment, but it does require the interpretation of
statutes to prevent the defeat of justice and the underlying in-
tent of the law through a mere change of the form of offenses
or the appearance of new offenses in character essentially the
same as those which the legislator had concretely in his mind.
Such interpretations are a commonplace of our jurisprudence,
and the reports are full of ruling cases in which laws have been
interpreted with far greater liberality than is required in the
case of the statute of vagabonds."
Then, (after quoting the Illinois statute33) "If the intention
of these words does not reach the modern gangster, gunman or
hoodlum, even under the rule of strictest interpretation of
criminal statutes, then it is impossible for legislative language
to express a clear general intent. The intent in this statute is
to bring under the discipline of the law and protect society from
'idle, dissolute persons,' who do not 'lawfully provide for them-
selves,' who 'neglect all lawful business,' and live the life of
what we now call the underworld. The fact that a hoodlum
has or can obtain money does not remove him from the cate-
gory of vagabond. The language is as definitely descriptive as
the experience of the time permitted, and its effort to cover the
whole field of dissolute and lawless living is as obvious as words
can make it. That it does not reach some modern fashions in
vagabonds, and especially the more sinister types of lawless
livers, men who go abroad armed without lawful excuse with
deadly weapons, frequenters of gang hang-outs, racketeers and
hoodlums, men who do not 'lawfully provide for themselves,'
offends not only common sense but in our judgment the strictest
principles of judicial interpretation.
"The prosecuting officials and the judges who are making use
of this statute in the war on organized and habitual criminality
are on sound legal ground, it now seems certain, and have shown
"Supra n. 12.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol16/iss2/5
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
a resourcefulness as well justified in legal principle as it is wel-
come to a community long and sorely afflicted."
Whether the procedure would be possible in a city where there
is not the dire emergency that existed in the city of Chicago is
perhaps doubtful. The press of other cities, in commenting on
the situation in that metropolis, endorsed the policy under the
special situation there, though recognizing the dangers of abuse
it entailed. 34
Following the Chicago precedent the practice is being tried,
at this writing, in the city of St. Louis; whether or not it will be
effective is yet to be determined. The efforts of the police have
the support of the local press,35 in spite of the fact that there is
no such emergency or crime wave there as existed in Chicago.
The statute under which warrants must issueo is by no means
as inclusive as that found in Illinois; officials differ as to its
scope and purpose. The remedy may perhaps be found in pro-
ceeding under the municipal ordinance, 37 which classes as a
vagrant "every person who shall be engaged in any unlawful call-
ing whatsoever." In such cases, however, prosecutions for the
particular unlawful act may be insisted upon by the judiciary. 8
The factor in that city which may defeat any effective use of the
enactments, even under the systematic policy of enforcement
inaugurated by the Department of, Police, 39 is the lack of any
acute emergency, other than general unemployment conditions
existing in most large cities, to focus public opinion on the ef-
forts of the police and crystallize public sentiment in favor of
such a policy.
II. PROSECUTIONS UNDER FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS
What is undoubtedly the most decided innovation so far
adopted to harass and bring to justice the organized criminals
is the prosecution of such characters for evasion of the Federal
income tax provisions. This method has been used with some
degree of success against certain of those named by the Chicago
Crime Commission as "public enemies, '1 4 , convictions having re-
sulted and prison sentences having been imposed, and has been
suggested as a possible procedure in the case of others against
whom felony prosecutions failed.4 1
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 24, 1930.
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 29, 1930; Post-Dispatch, Nov. 25, 1930.
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 3581.
Rev. Code of St. Louis, 1926, c. 24 art. 9 sec. 1527 (4).
Provisional Police Judge Stein, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1930.
"St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 27, 1930.
Ralph Capone, Jack Guzik, etc., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 20, 1930.
Scorfina case (Ill., 1930).
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The use of this method, however, has been quite vigorously
criticised by the President of the United States, who vehemently
disavowed any intention of proposing the extension of Federal
criminal laws to cover racketeering.2 The President said, in
part, "Every single state has ample laws that cover such
criminality. What is needed is the enforcement of those laws,
and not more laws. . . . The Federal Government is assisting
local authorities to overcome a hideous gangster and corrupt con-
trol of some local governments. But I get no satisfaction from
the reflection that the only way that this can be done is for the
Federal Government to convict men for failing to pay income
taxes on the financial products of crime against state laws."
This attitude of the President has been quite laudably received
by the press in general, on the basis that the adoption of a policy
of expansion of Federal laws to cover violations of state laws
would be a usurpation of state police power.4a It is undoubtedly
rather a disgraceful reflection upon state law enforcement that
gangsters are permitted to make millions on racketeering, boot-
legging, and other crimes and to corrupt or intimidate local offi-
cials, and then suffer only the penalties that the Federal Govern-
ment can deal out for failure to make correct income returns.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF MAXIMUM BAIL
A further method to be noted, by no means novel, is to be
found in the attitude adopted by some members of the judiciary
in fixing bail at a maximum figure for known criminal offenders
arrested on any charge whatsoever. In view of the rather uni-
form constitutional provisions in the various states prohibiting
excessive bail, and of the wealth and influence of many of the
organized criminals of today, the extent to which this practice
may be effective is speculative at most.
Where the offender or suspect can be arrested and charged
with a definite major crime or felony, or even as suspected of a
felony, the bail required can, of course, be rather substantial;
particularly if the man has an imposing criminal record with
other charges pending, a substantial bail may serve to insure
his incarceration over at least a short period. The purpose of
bond being to insure the attendance of the accused at his trial
or hearing, a combination of the above elements may result in
the fixing of bail at a figure which may be hard for even the
organized criminal and racketeer to meet, and yet be no violation
of constitutional provisions.
But in some localities officials have not stopped at that. In
the case of known police characters, with records of numerous
. Pres. Hoover, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 25, 1930.
" Mr. Hoover Hits the Nail, St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 28, 1930.
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arrests and convictions, arrested on a minor charge, the bail has
been set much higher than any ordinary conception of the pur-
poses of bond would seem to justify, the practice being resorted
to in a deliberate effort to prolong the period of incarceration.
In the case of a noted Chicago gangster,44 with a thirty-year
record of arrests, including convictions for rape, murder (with
the death sentence), robbery, conspiracy, and with other felony
indictments pending, the bail was set in Municipal Court at
$50,000 on a charge of vagrancy, and others have been held on
similar charges with bail of $5,000 to $10,000. In the former
case, which was taken to the Supreme Court of the State of Illi-
nois by application for a writ of habeas corpus, an authoritative
declaration of the problems involved in such a situation is to be
found in the opinion of that court, which reduced the bail of the
gangster to $5,000.45 In the words of the court, "This record may
be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of bail which
would be reasonably sufficient to insure his attendance to answer
this comparatively minor charge. But bail to answer this
charge cannot be fixed with reference to securing his appearance
to answer the other crimes with which he is charged, or at an
unreasonable amount for this charge, merely to detain and im-
prison him. . . . The amount of $50,000 could have no other
purpose than to make it impossible for him to give the bail and
to detain him in custody, and is unreasonable. The constitu-
tional right to be admitted to reasonable bail cannot be disre-
garded. The judge has no more right to disregard and 'violate
the constitution than the criminal has to violate the law. . . . A
criminal may have forfeited his right to liberty, but neither
courts nor any other power have the right to deprive him of it
except in accordance with the law of the land. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, in which the extreme penalty is im-
prisonment at hard labor for six months or a fine of $100, the
action of the court in requiring $50,000 bail was unreasonable
and violated the constitutional right of petitioner to be bailed
by sufficient sureties. He may be arrested under the other
charges against him and required to give bail to answer those
charges, but he cannot be required to give bail sufficient to
answer those charges upon the charge for which he is now
held."
The same decision, however, has been acclaimed by others as
an acceptance of and desire on the part of the distinguished
tribunal to sustain the procedure invoked by authorities in their
war on organized crime. In the editorial columns of a leading
"James ("Fur") Sammons.
People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow (Ill. 1930) 173 N. E. 8.
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American daily newspaper the following recently appeared:46
"The fixing of the bail of the gangster Sammons at $5,000 by the
highest court of the state, although it was a reduction of the sum
fixed by the lower court, will hearten the citizens now engaged
in a pitched battle with organized crime. While the Supreme
Court refused on constitutional grounds to approve prohibitive
bail, it fixed by its own high authority a sum much larger than
would in other circumstances be required for the charge of
vagrancy in common form.
"The learned justices therefore recognized the special situa-
tion with which this and other communities in the United States
have found themselves and the special dangers and difficulties
with which society is now compelled to deal. The modern vaga-
bond or gangster is no longer a lone individual. He is a wolf of
the pack--an habitual evildoer, organized with others, and
especially since the coming of prohibition, provided with funds
greater than his own and sufficient to make available to him
every resource of the law and without the law. The sufficiency
of bail in his case must be determined by these notorious con-
ditions, which the Supreme Court, it would seem, has refused to
ignore. As the available means, extensive if subterranean in-
fluence, and organized resources of the modern gangster are far
beyond those of the old-time criminal or ne'er-do-well, the test
of bail, unless it is to insure the defeat of justice, must take
these conditions into account. Vagrancy in the common sense
is not that of the gangster vagabond, which involves potentiali-
ties more serious to society.
"The Supreme Court has therefore not only assisted properly
in the effort of law-abiding citizens to deal with organized crim-
inality in its present form, but it has shown a conception of the
responsibilities of judicial interpretation which strengthens the
law and public confidence in our courts as practical agencies of
the public weal."
CONCLUSION
Whether or not the use of the various methods of law enforce-
ment outlined herein, or any one of them, is to be commended or
condemned is a matter of opinion. But the question is worthy
of the consideration of every member of the legal profession, and
of every citizen as well. The matter of the enforcement of law
and prevention of crime, particularly as applied to the situation
of organized gangsters and racketeers, whose exploits of lawless-
ness and violence are of almost daily occurrence, is one of the
greatest problems facing this nation. The gravity of the situa-
tion is indicated in part by the fact that not only the states, but
" Chicago Tribune, Oct. 24, 1930.
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Federal authorities as well, have been compelled to take cog-
nizance of the conditions that exist in certain municipalities and
local areas. The possibilities involved in the situation are well
illustrated by a recent suggestion of a prominent legal edu-
cator,4 7 and the comment occasioned thereby,4 8 advocating the
establishment of a commission with certain safeguards having
power to convict individuals as public enemies and fix the terms
of their removal from society, without the necessity of a con-
viction for a specific offense as common law and statutes require,
and a policy of requiring suspected individuals to give bond and
report daily to authorities. So radical a change in our legal
machinery would probably be advocated by few today. But it
is obvious that the answer to the question of law enforcement
and organized crime must be determined in a way that will
strengthen the agencies of law enforcement and restore a waning
public confidence in the agencies of enforcement, even though it
entail the use of so-called extra-legal agencies and devices, or the
substitution for present agencies of some system more adaptable
to twentieth century conditions.
CARL V. EIMBECK, '31.
Wiley B. Rutledge, Acting Dean, Washington University School of Law,
St. Louis, Mo.
' St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 3, 1930.
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